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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania charged Bernard 
Lambert as a co-conspirator with and accomplice to Aquil 
Tillman’s acts of murder, aggravated assault, and burglary.  
Their trial was joint.  In preparation for trial, Tillman made 
statements to a testifying expert that implicated Lambert in 
Tillman’s criminal plan.  Recognizing that Tillman (who did 
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not testify) would not be subject to cross-examination when 
the expert recounted his statements, the trial judge required 
counsel to redact facially incriminating references to Lambert 
from that testimony.  However, the expert testified about parts 
of Tillman’s statements that may have become inferentially 
incriminating in the context of trial.  
 
Lambert asserts that the prosecution used these 
statements for an impermissible hearsay purpose in its case 
against him.  Our review of the record persuades us that there 
is some merit to his argument that his Confrontation Clause 
rights were violated.  Because counsel may have been 
ineffective for failing to cure this potential constitutional 
violation, we vacate and remand for an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether the Commonwealth used Tillman’s 
testimonial statements for their hearsay purpose and, if so, 
whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a 
limiting jury instruction.   
I. Background 
A. The trial 
In January of 1997 Tillman went to the house in 
Philadelphia of his former girlfriend, Khadijah Freeman. He 
entered without permission, broke the lock on her bedroom 
door, and found her with another man, Shaheed Smith.  
Tillman and Smith fought each other, and Tillman left.  
 
The next night, Tillman returned to Freeman’s house 
and broke the front door to enter.  Freeman’s mother, Ann 
Marie Thomas, demanded that Tillman pay for the broken 
door and took $300 from his pocket.  Tillman and Smith 
fought a second time, and Tillman left saying he would come 
back for Smith.  Lambert drove Tillman back to Freeman’s 
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house 15 minutes later.  Lambert waited outside when 
Tillman reentered.  
 
Inside, Thomas denied having any money of 
Tillman’s, and Tillman shot her in the head, killing her 
instantly.  Tillman then dragged Freeman out to the front 
porch and shot her by the car, causing serious injuries.  
Tillman then got in the car, and Lambert drove away from the 
house.  
 
The Commonwealth prosecuted Lambert and Tillman in a 
joint jury trial. Tillman was charged with first-degree murder, 
aggravated assault, burglary, and criminal conspiracy. But for 
the murder charge being second degree, the same offenses 
applied to Lambert under the Commonwealth’s theory that he 
was a co-conspirator and accomplice.  
 
The Commonwealth presented no direct evidence of 
any criminal plan between Lambert and Tillman prior to 
Tillman’s third return to the house.  It relied only on their 
prior friendship (Tillman was a PCP user with a history of 
mental health problems, and Lambert would give Tillman 
rides to pick up his psychiatric medications), Lambert’s 
presence, and that Lambert drove Tillman away after 
witnessing him shoot Freeman.   
 
At trial, Tillman admitted to the crimes, but argued 
that he lacked specific intent because of his mental illness.  
Tillman did not take the stand; instead, an expert psychiatrist, 
Dr. Julie Kessel, testified about the statements Tillman made 
to her describing what happened to him and how he 
responded.  While the court required the parties to redact a 
portion of the statements in which Tillman asserted that 
Lambert gave him a gun, it did not otherwise limit Dr. 
Kessel’s testimony or provide instructions to the jury that the 
statements could not be used against Lambert.  
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 When the prosecution cross-examined Dr. Kessel, she 
provided the following testimony about how Tillman 
explained the events that occurred between when he left the 
house and when he returned with a gun (to repeat, a 15-
minute time-frame):  
 
Prosecutor: All right.  And he [Tillman] used the word 
“angry.”  Those other words that are in your notes, 
correct? 
Dr. Kessel: Yes, I believe so.  
Prosecutor: It says “very angry,” does it not? 
Dr. Kessel: I trust your reading of my record. . . .  
Prosecutor: All right. And he also indicated underneath 
that he said, damn, you let him beat you up, you got to 
get him back, you can’t let him do that, right? 
Dr. Kessel: I indicated that he is hearing that.  
Prosecutor: Okay. And that’s what he told you, 
 correct? 
Dr. Kessel: Yes.  
Prosecutor: All right.  And he went and he got a gun, 
 right? 
Dr. Kessel: Yes.  
 
J.A. at 617-18. 
 
On redirect, Tillman’s counsel asked a clarifying 
question: 
 
Counsel: And she asked you whether Mr. Tillman told 
you that he had to get his money back and he said he 
had to get his money back and you made mention, I 
think, of some kind of reference to that’s what he was 
hearing, voices or something of that nature.  Would 
you elaborate on that? Do you know what I’m talking 
about? 
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Dr. Kessel: He was hearing that outside his head.  That 
was not something he was hearing inside of his head 
from my recollection and the way I’ve recorded this.  
 
Id.  at 621.  
 
In her closing arguments, the prosecutor referenced Dr. 
Kessel’s testimony as follows:  
And what Dr. O’Brien [an expert witness for the 
Commonwealth] says is, look, [Tillman] may have 
problems in his life but I can’t state that to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty, and that’s 
where I disagreed with Dr. Kessel… [about] how can 
you have a specific motive to go back and get [your] 
money and not a specific intent?  
Id. at 644.  
 
 She went on to argue for an inference of a shared   
criminal plan prior to Tillman’s third break-in: 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, look at [Tillman’s] actions and 
I’m telling you right now he could not have done them 
alone, he needed help, and that’s where [Lambert] 
comes in… We know there is a fifteen-minute window 
of opportunity from when [Tillman] leaves Freeman]’s 
house to when he enters [her] house, and that period of 
time he’s got to get the gun and he’s got to come back.  
Well, you know from the diagrams where [she] lives 
and where [he] lives, he couldn’t walk there in fifteen 
minutes… I submit to you what happened is [Lambert] 
was there the first time and that [Tillman] was able to 
use [him], drive away, and drive back because we 
know there is not enough time for [him] to make a 
phone call even.  You only have fifteen minutes and 
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that fifteen minute period he’s got to go, get the gun, 
and come back and, again, ladies and gentleman, the 
Judge told you, and you can use reasonable inferences.  
In other words, use your common sense.  They are in 
the car together.  You don’t think that they are talking 
about what just happened at all?  It’s just quiet?  It’s 
nothing?” 
 
Id. 
 
The jury convicted Lambert of conspiracy, burglary, and 
second-degree felony murder.  His counsel filed a motion for 
relief on the ground that evidence of Lambert’s presence at 
the scene was insufficient to establish that he had the requisite 
foreknowledge of Tillman’s criminal intent.  
 
The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Lambert 
to life imprisonment.  In upholding the jury’s verdict, the trial 
court relied on the redacted portion of Tillman’s statements—
though, of course, it was not in evidence before the jury—in 
which Tillman alleged that he went to Lambert’s home to get 
a gun before Lambert drove him back to Freeman’s house.  
B. Direct Appeal 
On appeal, a panel of the Superior Court affirmed the trial 
court’s opinion.1  The panel also cited to the portion of 
Tillman’s statement not in evidence before the jury (alleging 
Lambert helped Tillman get the gun) as a basis for affirming 
the trial court.  
 
The Superior Court reheard the case en banc.  It 
recognized the evidentiary error in a footnote, but nonetheless 
                                              
1 The Superior Courts function as the initial courts of 
appeal in Pennsylvania.  
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found there was sufficient evidence on the record before the 
jury to support Lambert’s convictions.  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal.  
C. Post-Conviction Relief- Commonwealth Courts 
Lambert, acting pro se, sought relief under Pennsylvania’s 
Post Conviction Relief Act.  42 Pa. Const. Stat. §§ 4541 et 
seq.  Appointed counsel filed a no-merit letter, and the PCRA 
court granted counsel’s request to withdraw and dismissed 
Lambert’s petition. Lambert appealed pro se to the Superior 
Court.  It concluded that appointed counsel’s no-merit letter 
was defective and remanded with an order that the PCRA 
court appoint new counsel.   
 
On remand, new counsel also filed a no-merit letter.  The 
PCRA court granted this second attorney’s request to 
withdraw and issued notice of its intent to dismiss Lambert’s 
petition without a hearing.  Lambert filed an amended pro se 
petition alleging that new PCRA counsel was ineffective and 
asserting why the court should grant him relief.  The PCRA 
court denied Lambert’s petition, and the Superior Court 
affirmed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court again denied 
allowance of appeal.  
D. Post-Conviction Relief- Federal Court 
Lambert then filed a pro se federal habeas petition in the 
District Court. He raised fourteen grounds for relief, 
including that (1) the trial court violated his Confrontation 
Clause rights in failing to instruct the jury not to consider 
statements of his co-defendant related by Dr. Kessel as 
evidence against him, (2) trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to the alleged Confrontation Clause error, 
and (3) there was insufficient evidence to sustain the 
convictions. 
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The Magistrate Judge concluded that the trial court 
violated Lambert’s Confrontation Clause rights; she found 
that Tillman’s statements to his psychiatrist about the voices 
outside his head were incriminating on their face because it 
would have been immediately apparent to the jury that 
Lambert was the person in the car who, after learning of 
Tillman’s altercation with Smith, encouraged him to seek 
revenge.2 Though the Magistrate Judge also recommended 
denying relief on the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, she 
recognized that “at some point, weakly supported convictions, 
which require barely tenable inferences for their affirmance, 
must be reversed… [, and t]his might very well be such a 
case.”).  J.A.  23.  The Judge therefore recommended granting 
a certificate of appealability on this claim.  The District Court 
adopted the Report and Recommendation and ordered the 
Commonwealth to retry or release Lambert.  
 
The Commonwealth moved for reconsideration, and this 
time the District Court vacated its order and referred the case 
back to the Magistrate Judge to determine (1) whether 
Lambert’s Confrontation Clause claim and his ineffective 
assistance claim based on that violation were procedurally 
defaulted, and (2) whether the default was excused.   
 
In her second Report and Recommendation, the 
Magistrate Judge concluded that Lambert had procedurally 
defaulted both claims and that there was no cause to excuse 
default.  She also rejected the Confrontation Clause claim on 
                                              
2 Because Lambert challenges more than one portion 
of the interview between Tillman and the examining 
psychiatrist, we refer to the testimony as “statements.” We 
note, however, that the Magistrate Judge referred to them 
collectively as a single statement.  
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the merits, reasoning that Tillman’s statements were neither 
testimonial nor hearsay, and that any incriminating elements 
would not have been readily apparent when the statements 
were made.   
 
The District Court denied relief, but granted a certificate 
of appealability as to the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim.  
We expanded the certificate of appealability to cover whether 
Lambert is procedurally barred from pursuing his ineffective-
assistance claim based on an alleged Confrontation Clause 
violation.   
 
We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that, while 
a close case, the Superior Court did not unreasonably apply 
federal law in finding the evidence was sufficient to support a 
conviction.  We therefore deny relief on that claim.  However, 
we conclude that PCRA counsel provided ineffective 
assistance in failing to raise Lambert’s ineffective-assistance-
of-trial-counsel claim based on the alleged Confrontation 
Clause violation.  We further conclude that this claim has 
some merit.  Therefore, Lambert has shown cause to excuse 
his default.  We remand to the District Court for an 
evidentiary hearing to develop the record and to determine the 
merits of the ineffectiveness claim against trial counsel.   
II. Standard of Review 
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1291 and 2253 and conduct a fresh review of the District 
Court's legal conclusions. Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 
191 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
We review a state court decision under the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA).  Under AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, if 
a claim is “adjudicated on the merits in State court 
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proceedings,” we can grant relief only if the state court 
decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 
by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on 
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented” in state court.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).   
 
We can grant relief under the “contrary to” standard 
only if  “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that 
reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the 
state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] 
Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.”  
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000).  A decision 
from a state court “is an unreasonable application of [the 
Supreme Court's] clearly established precedent if it correctly 
identifies the governing legal rule but applies that rule 
unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case.”  
White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1706 (2014).  (Nothing is 
before us claiming an unreasonable determination of facts.) 
III. Analysis 
A. Sufficiency-of-the-Evidence Claim 
Lambert first argues that the Commonwealth had 
insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions.  For such a 
claim, we ask if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 
(1979) (emphasis in text).  
 
Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas 
proceedings because they are subject to two layers of 
deference.  “First, on direct appeal.  .  .  [a] reviewing court 
may set aside the jury’s verdict on the ground of insufficient 
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evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have agreed 
with the jury.”  Second, “on habeas review, a federal court 
may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency 
of the evidence challenge .  .  .  [unless] the state court 
decision was objectively unreasonable.”  Coleman v. 
Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012) (quotations omitted) 
(citations omitted).  
1. Elements of conspiracy under state law 
A conviction for criminal conspiracy requires the trier 
of fact to find: “(1) the defendant intended to commit or aid in 
the commission of the criminal act; (2) the defendant entered 
into an agreement with another to engage in the crime; and 
(3) the defendant or one or more of the other co-conspirators 
committed an overt act in furtherance of the agreed upon 
crime.”  Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 920 (Pa. 
2009) (quotation omitted).  The unlawful agreement “may be 
established inferentially by circumstantial evidence, i.e.[,] the 
relations, conduct or circumstances of the parties or overt acts 
on the part of co-conspirators.”  Commonwealth v. Spotz, 716 
A.2d 580, 592 (Pa. 1998) (citation omitted).  
2. The Superior Court’s decision 
The Superior Court looked to whether circumstantial 
evidence of association, presence, knowledge, and 
participation could “furnish a web of evidence linking 
[Lambert] to the alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable 
doubt when viewed in conjunction with each other and in the 
context in which they occurred.” Lambert, 795 A.2d at 1016 
(quotations and citations omitted).  The Court found Tillman 
and Lambert were associates based on evidence of their 
friendship.  Id. at 1017.  Witness testimony identified 
Lambert as present at the curbside when Tillman left the 
house where Thomas and Freeman lived.  Id.  In addressing 
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knowledge and participation, the Court relied on the 
following facts: Lambert drove Tillman to the house, 
remained double-parked in the car after Tillman got out on 
the passenger’s side (leaving the car door open), and was 
close enough to see the damage to the front door of the house 
as Tillman “forced his way into the home and [] fired a gun.”  
Id.  Witness testimony also alleged that Lambert drove 
Tillman from the crime scene.  
 
Because we must defer to a jury’s findings and to a state 
court’s conclusions when circumstantial evidence, viewed in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution, provides some 
reasonable basis for jurors to infer required intent, Coleman, 
132 S. Ct at 2064, we conclude that the Superior Court’s 
finding was not unreasonable.  A rational juror could have 
inferred, based on the testimony from lay and expert 
witnesses, that Lambert knew Tillman intended to get his 
money back and drove him to the scene of the crime with the 
intent to help him do so.  A juror could have further inferred 
that, by waiting double-parked with the door open, Lambert 
intended to facilitate burglary by providing a getaway car.  
This web of inferences would be sufficient for a juror to find 
Lambert and Tillman had a “shared criminal plan.”3 Thus we 
cannot say that no rational trier of fact could have agreed with 
the verdict.  We therefore cannot conclude that it was 
objectively unreasonable for the Superior Court to decide that 
Lambert was guilty of the crimes convicted.  
                                              
3 Lambert argues that the record cannot establish his 
foreknowledge of the burglary under the standard in 
Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct 1240 (2014), but that 
decision post-dates the Superior Court’s decision and 
therefore does not qualify as clearly established Supreme 
Court precedent at the time of the Superior Court’s ruling.  
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B. Ineffective Assistance and the Confrontation 
Clause.  
Lambert argues that the psychiatrist’s testimony 
relating Tillman’s statements about voices he was hearing 
from “outside his head” implicated Lambert’s Sixth 
Amendment right to confront the person who actually mate 
those statements (Tillman).  Based on this alleged 
Confrontation Clause violation, he contends trial counsel was 
ineffective in failing to request a limiting jury instruction. 
Lambert concedes that he has procedurally defaulted this 
claim.  He can overcome the default if he can show that 
“some objective factor external to the defense impeded [his] 
efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rule.”  Coleman, 
501 U.S. at 753.  
 
Lambert argues that ineffective assistance of PCRA 
counsel was the external factor that precluded him from 
raising the limiting-instruction claim in the first instance in 
his PCRA petition.  Where (as here) state law requires a 
petitioner to wait until the first collateral proceeding to raise 
trial counsel ineffectiveness, PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness 
may provide cause to excuse the defaulted ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.  See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 
S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012); see also Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 
759, 779-80 (2017).  
 
For PCRA counsel’s performance to qualify as 
constitutionally deficient, it must fall “below an objective 
standard of reasonableness,” and Lambert must be prejudiced 
thereby.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).   
Even if he can meet this standard, he must also “demonstrate 
that the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 
claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner 
must demonstrate that the claim has ‘some merit’.”  Martinez, 
132 S. Ct. at 1318-19 (citation omitted).  
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Because the merit of Lambert’s ineffective-assistance-
of-trial-counsel claim informs our consideration of whether 
PCRA counsel was ineffective and whether Lambert was 
prejudiced by PCRA counsel’s conduct, we address his 
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim first.  As a 
threshold matter, Lambert must show that Tillman’s 
statements related by Dr. Kessel were testimony used for a 
hearsay purpose against him.  If Tillman’s statements qualify 
as testimonial hearsay, they are subject to the Confrontation 
Clause, which requires the court to instruct the jury that it 
cannot rely on these statements to support inferences of 
Lambert’s guilt (because Tillman was not subject to cross-
examination).  See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 207 
(1987).  Next, Lambert must demonstrate that he presents a 
substantial claim that trial counsel’s failure to request such a 
limiting instruction was objectively unreasonable and 
prejudiced him.   
1. Right to Confrontation 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant 
the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”  
U.S. Const. amend. VI.  This right applies only to testimonial 
statements offered for their truth.  Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 50-51; 59-60 n.9 (2004) (citing Tennessee v. 
Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)).  If a witness is unavailable 
(and Tillman was so because he opted not to testify), hearsay 
testimony of that person is not admissible unless the 
defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.  Id. 
at 68.  However, the Confrontation Clause does not apply to 
non-testimonial statements or testimony that is not used for a 
hearsay purpose.  Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 822, 823-24 
(2006).   
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We address first the meaning of “testimonial.”  Ex 
parte examinations and interrogations used as a functional 
equivalent for in-court testimony are the “core class of 
‘testimonial’ statements” that directly implicate the right of 
confrontation.  Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 at 68.  When a 
statement does not fall within this “core class,” it is still 
testimonial if it was taken with the primary purpose of 
creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.  
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011).  We analyze 
the circumstances in which the statement was taken to assess 
what reasonable participants would perceive the primary 
purpose to be.  Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2183 (2016).  
As Tillman did not make his statements during an ex parte 
investigation or custodial interrogation, we apply the primary 
purpose test. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that Tillman’s statements 
cannot be testimonial because they were not made with the 
primary purpose of creating evidence for the prosecution.  
However, the text of the Confrontation Clause does not 
constrain the time at which one becomes a “‘witnes[s].’  
Indeed, .  .  .  a declarant may become a ‘witnes[s]’ before the 
accused’s prosecution.”  Williams v. Illinois, 132. S. Ct. 2221, 
2262 (2012) (Thomas, J. concurring) (alteration in original). 
 
We also cannot accept the Commonwealth’s position 
that the Confrontation Clause applies only to statements made 
with the intent to accuse. “A statement that is not facially 
inculpatory may turn out to be highly probative of a 
defendant’s guilt when considered with other evidence.”  Id.  
While the individual making the statement may do so without 
the intent to accuse the defendant, she may become a witness 
against the accused in the context of trial.  See Melendez-Diaz 
v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 314 (2009) (emphasizing that 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence recognizes the right to 
confront a witness even where the “adverse witness’s 
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testimony, taken alone, will not suffice to convict.”).  Thus 
Lambert need not prove that the primary purpose of recording 
Tillman’s statements was to accuse him or Tillman of the 
alleged criminal acts.  Instead, in the context of the joint trial, 
Lambert needs only to show that Tillman’s statements to Dr. 
Kessel were made with the primary purpose of substituting 
for his in-court testimony about the crime.  We believe that 
occurred here; hence Tillman’s statements are testimonial. 
a. Hearsay analysis 
Because these statements were testimonial, we next 
determine if the prosecution used them for the truth asserted 
therein to establish the elements required to convict.  In 
making this determination, we are not to accept the 
prosecution’s “not-for-truth” rationale at face value, but 
instead must determine if there is a “‘legitimate, non hearsay 
purpose,’” Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2257 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (citing Street, 471 U.S. at 417) (emphasis in text), 
by “thoroughly examin[ing] the use of the out-of-court 
[statements] and the efficacy of a limiting instruction,” id.  
 
While the expert used Tillman’s statements to form an 
opinion about Tillman’s intent to commit a crime (known to 
lawyers and judges by the Latin term “mens rea”), the 
prosecutor may have relied on it to establish Lambert’s guilt. 
In closing, the prosecutor urged the jury to draw the inference 
that Lambert and Tillman plotted together in the car (to 
support the conclusion that Lambert had foreknowledge of 
Tillman’s criminal plan and intended to aid in its completion).  
If the jury believed Tillman’s statements to Dr. Kessel—
asserting that Tillman responded to a voice (coming from 
outside his head) and encouraging him to “get back” at Smith 
and Thomas, it could infer from this belief that Lambert—the 
only other person in the car to supply the voice—intended to 
aid Tillman in carrying out the crime.  If the prosecution 
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relied on Tillman’s statements to support this inference, they 
would qualify as hearsay. 
 
That Lambert was tried before a jury instead of at a 
bench trial makes us particularly concerned that the 
statements were used for a hearsay purpose.  When an expert 
testifies before a jury, federal law generally prohibits her 
from disclosing facts about which she lacks personal 
knowledge.  While a trial judge “presum[ably] will 
understand the limited reason for the disclosure of the 
underlying inadmissible information and will not rely on that 
information for any improper purpose,” Williams, 132 S. Ct. 
at 2235, this presumption does not apply to a jury.  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has suggested that even “non-hearsay” 
testimonial evidence poses a danger of confusing the jury and 
requires limiting instructions.  Id. at 2236 (“The dissent's 
argument would have force if petitioner had elected to have a 
jury trial.  In that event, there would have been a danger of 
the jury's taking [the expert’s] testimony as proof [of the 
matter asserted in the statement on which she relied in 
forming her opinion].  Absent an evaluation of the risk of 
juror confusion and careful jury instructions, the testimony 
could not have gone to the jury.”).  
 
To the extent the prosecution relied on Tillman’s 
statements to Dr. Kessel for their truth, a limiting instruction 
to the jury was needed.  Because the Confrontation Clause 
prohibits the Commonwealth from using testimonial 
statements by non-testifying witnesses to establish a 
defendant’s guilt, it may not use redacted testimony from a 
non-testifying co-defendant to support inferences against the 
defendant in their joint trial.  See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 
207; Bruton v. U.S., 391 123, 137 (1968).  Even when a non-
testifying witness’s statement is redacted so that it is no 
longer facially incriminating, a court presiding over such a 
joint trial must nonetheless instruct the jury that it may not 
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consider this evidence in determining whether the state met 
its burden of proving the defendant’s guilt.  Gray v. 
Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 189 (1998); Richardson, 481 U.S. at 
211.  Without such a limiting instruction, inferentially 
incriminating statements make the non-testifying co-
defendant a witness against the accused in violation of the 
Confrontation Clause.  Cf. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 314 
n.4 (“The very premise of [Gray] was that, without the 
limiting instruction[,] even admission of a redacted 
confession containing evidence [that only supports 
incriminating inferences in the context of later evidence 
introduced at trial] would have violated the defendant's Sixth 
Amendment rights.”). 
 
We conclude that reasonable jurists could find that the 
prosecutor’s closing argument relied on the truth of Tillman’s 
statements to Dr. Kessel to draw inferences of Lambert’s 
foreknowledge and intent to aid in Tillman’s criminal plan.  
Our remand includes the request that the District Court 
consider this issue.  
2. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel  
Lambert next alleges that counsel was ineffective in 
failing to request jury instructions that would protect his 
Confrontation Clause rights.  We recognize that the “right of 
confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and 
fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this 
country's constitutional goal.”  Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 
400, 405 (1965).  Thus a good argument exists that Lambert 
presents a substantial claim that it would be objectively 
unreasonable for trial counsel to allow the Commonwealth to 
violate this right by failing to request a limiting instruction.   
 
As for the prejudice prong of Strickland, without Dr. 
Kessel’s testimony about Tillman’s statements to her, there 
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would be no direct evidence to establish more than Lambert’s 
mere presence at, and failure to leave, the scene of the crime: 
there was no direct evidence indicating any agreement 
between Tillman and Lambert.  The prosecutor likely 
recognized this gap, and thus inferred in her closing argument 
that Lambert encouraged Tillman to seek vengeance against 
the residents of the Thomas-Freeman household when the two 
were in the car together.  Lambert therefore has presented a 
substantial claim that a jury instruction was required here.  
3. Necessity of an evidentiary hearing  
Determining whether trial counsel was ineffective often 
requires a court to develop evidence beyond the trial record.  
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317-18. Because the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court determined Lambert’s claim of ineffective 
assistance was procedurally defaulted, it never conducted an 
evidentiary hearing to develop this claim.  Without such a 
hearing, Lambert had no meaningful opportunity to challenge 
Strickland’s presumption that trial counsel acted reasonably.   
 
And it wasn’t that Lambert didn’t request a hearing.  His 
“Response to Notice of Intention to Dismiss/Request For 
Evidentiary Hearing and Appointment of New Counsel,” 
clarifying his “Second Supplemental Amended PCRA 
Petition,” demonstrates sufficient efforts to develop the 
factual basis for his ineffective-assistance claim to survive 
2254(e)(2)’s jurisdictional bar.  Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 
105, 125-26 (3d Cir. 2009).  Yet the Superior Court 
determined the claim was defaulted under an independent 
state procedural law.4 
                                              
4 While the Magistrate Judge concluded that the Superior 
Court’s disposition of Lambert’s Confrontation Clause claim 
qualified as a decision on the merits under 28 U.S.C. 
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In this context, we may direct the District Court to 
conduct that hearing. Horn, 570 F.3d at 125; Marshall v. 
Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 106, 117 (3d. Cir. 2002).  Whether 
we do so depends on whether Lambert has shown PCRA 
counsel’s ineffective assistance caused procedural default of 
his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, and prejudice 
resulted.  
4. PCRA counsel’s conduct excuses default of 
Lambert’s ineffective-assistance claim 
If Lambert can establish that PCRA counsel was 
ineffective in failing to raise the former’s ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claim based on the Confrontation 
Clause violation, the District Court may consider the merits 
                                                                                                     
§ 2254(d), we disagree.  The Superior Court first determined 
that Lambert waived this claim by failing to raise it 
previously and then added: “To the extent that Lambert did 
raise these claims before the PCRA court, we would conclude 
that they each lack merit.”  J.A. at 418 (emphasis added).  
While “it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated 
the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or 
state-law procedural principles to the contrary,” Harrington v. 
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011), “[t]he presumption may be 
overcome when there is reason to think some other 
explanation for the state court’s decision is more likely,  id. at 
99-100.  Here the Superior Court provided that reason, 
asserting that Lambert’s claim was waived on a state 
procedural ground.  J.A. at 418.  This reason is clear on the 
face of the opinion without recourse to the record before the 
state courts.  Moreover, the full text of the opinion suggests 
the statement about the merits of the claim is a dictum, not a 
holding in the alternative.  Id. at 417-19.  
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of this otherwise-defaulted claim.  Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 
1318.  In his appellate brief to the Superior Court, Lambert 
argued: “The factual record is devoid of any recitation by the 
trial court on the requisite instructions to the jury ‘not to 
consider the redacted confession of Mr. Tillman as evidence 
against [Lambert,]” and the prosecutor “both explicitly and 
impliedly used Mr. Tillman’s confession to argue . . .  that 
[Lambert] was guilty of conspiring to burglarize and murder 
Ann Marie Thomas.”  State Habeas App’x, Ex. L, 71.  PCRA 
counsel recast this claim as a challenge to admission of 
“several hearsay statements made by the co-defendant,” and 
characterized it as meritless because “the co-defendant 
[Tillman] was tried with the Petitioner [Lambert] at the same 
trial[,] so the statements are not hearsay but a direct party 
admission.” J.A. at 390.  This justification misstates the law.   
 
“An attorney's ignorance of a point of law that is 
fundamental to his case combined with his failure to perform 
basic research on that point is a quintessential example of 
unreasonable performance under Strickland.”  Hinton v. 
Alabama, 134 S. Ct 1081, 1088–89 (2014).  It is well 
established that the jury cannot consider statements offered 
for the truth of the matter asserted by a non-testifying co-
defendant as evidence against the defendant.  Gray, 523 U.S. 
185.  Moreover, where the evidence is admitted at trial, the 
jury must be instructed that it may only consider the evidence 
in the case against the co-defendant.  Melendez-Diaz, 557 
U.S. at 314 n.4.  By characterizing the statements as party 
admissions, PCRA counsel accepted that the Commonwealth 
sought to use them for the truth of the matter asserted.  Such 
hearsay statements of a non-testifying co-defendant are not 
admissible as “direct admissions” when they are used by the 
prosecution as evidence against the defendant.  The 
conclusion: even a cursory investigation into Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence would lead counsel to identify the 
potential Confrontation Clause violation.  
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Per our discussion in the preceding sections, admission 
of these inferentially incriminating statements without a 
limiting instruction was fundamental to Lambert’s case.  
Moreover, at the post-conviction stage we cannot discern any 
objectively reasonable strategy for PCRA counsel to reject 
this potentially meritorious claim.  
 
As for prejudice, Lambert has demonstrated “a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
error[], the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  As noted, the only 
direct link in the chain of inferences for the conspiracy 
conviction was Dr. Kessel’s testimony relaying Tillman’s 
statements, which PCRA counsel represented in his no-merit 
letter as direct-party admissions.  In response to that no-merit 
letter, the PCRA court denied Lambert’s request for an 
evidentiary hearing and dismissed his appeal.  The Superior 
Court affirmed the PCRA court’s decision.  Neither court 
reached the merits of the underlying ineffectiveness claim 
against trial counsel.  Had PCRA counsel investigated and 
presented the claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing 
to request a limiting instruction, the PCRA court would have 
considered it and the Superior Court would have reviewed 
this determination in depth.  Because the claim no doubt has 
some (and arguably more than some) merit, we conclude that 
PCRA counsel’s ineffective assistance excuses Lambert’s 
procedural default.  
 
* * * * * 
 
We vacate and remand to the District Court with 
instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing to consider the 
ineffective assistance of Lambert’s trial counsel.   
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